fluenced military experts and statesmen in Britain, France and Germany during the 1938 Munich crisis, most studies of 1938 concentrate on diplomatic rather than military events 1 . Critics and defenders of the appeasers of Hitler nonetheless frequently relate their arguments to military matters. In his memoirs, Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes bitterly denounced the policies of Britain and France and argued that Czechoslovakia had fortifications which were "at least as efficient as the Maginot Line and in some respects surpassed it" 2 . Sir Winston Churchill accused Chamberlain and Daladier of abandoning Czechoslovakia's excellent army and "Maginot Line"; and Keith Eubank, expressing a contrary viewpoint, has argued that the Czechs could easily have been overrun 3 . Benes, Churchill, Eubank and other writers base many of their conclusions on assumptions regarding the Czechoslovak military position; but none has presented detailed evidence on Czechoslovak defenses, even though a description of the defenses could demonstrate whether British and French inaction in 1938 was justified and whether, as has been asserted by some critics of the appeasers, the German capture of the Czechoslovak fortifications helped reveal the "secrets" of the Maginot Line 4 . Many aspects of Czechoslovak defenses could be studied in detail, but at the heart of the strategic plans of the Czechoslovak General Staff was the role envisaged for the Czechoslovak system of fortifications. Czechoslovakia's air force was badly outnumbered by the Luftwaffe, and the nation had an inadequate number of anti-aircraft guns 5 . The Czechs had only four motorized infantry divisions, and their motorized forces were far inferior to the German 6 . Even the theoretical strength of the Czechoslovak Army -1,250,000 men after the September 23 mobilization -may not be taken at face value. Czechs made up only 51% of the troop strength, and a Communist historian has admitted that many German reservists failed to report for duty in September and that many units with Germans were badly understaffed 7 . The strength of the fortifications would therefore have been crucial in affecting the immediate success or partial failure of German attacks in the event of an outbreak of war. Indeed, a great proportion of Czechoslovak military expenditures was concentrated in the fortifications program 8 . A survey of historical literature on the 1938 Munich crisis quickly reveals that since 1938, the Czechoslovak fortifications have been the object of continuing speculation. In 1938, for example, Basil Liddell Hart conjectured that German progress in the Czech frontier zone would be "slow" 9 . While writers like Churchill upheld this view, the appeasers and their apologists denied that the Czech defenses were especially formidable. The French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet wrote that the Anschluss left a huge gap in Czechoslovakia's southern defenses 10 . Bonnet was correct in this assessment; but differing views of the fortifications stubbornly persist: Joseph Rothschild, the author of a recent history of interwar Eastern Europe, claims that the Czechs had time to work on their southern defense after March; and Rothschild goes on to assert that the Czechs should have fought from their strong defensive position 11 . A few scholars, notably Keith Eubank, have questioned whether the Czechoslovak 81 MGM 2/76 Army could have held out for long; but generally historians incline to the view that a German conquest of the Czech lands would not have been easy 12 .
Czech historians, who have access to information not available in the West, have usually issued rather sweeping statements about the efficacy of the fortifications 13 16 .
Careful consideration of evidence regarding the fortifications found in Nuremberg trial testimony and in German memoirs rapidly leads one to the conclusion that authors citing Nuremberg testimony have used evidence selectively. In a pre-trial interrogation, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl commented that the Czechoslovak fortifications did not offer a serious obstacle to German forces and that comparing them with the Maginot Line, as some people did, was like comparing a rowboat with a battleship 17 ! Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel wrote in his memoirs that German 88 mm flak easily broke through Czech bunkers, and General Heinz Guderian wrote that the first line of fortifications was "nicht so stark wie wir gedacht hatten" 18 . Yet at Nuremberg, Keitel stated that the Germans never could have broken through the fortifications; Erich von Manstein, who helped plan the operations against Czechoslovakia, testified that Germany "didn't have the means" to break through the fortifications 19 28 . By the following year, work was being carried out at a furious pace which continued right up through September, 1938.
In addition to constructing fixed positions for frontier defense, the Czechs augmented their policing of the frontier area. 30 . Expenditures for the gendarmery escalated enormously from 1937 to 1938, as the gendarmery were used for protection against infiltrators from Germany. In 1936 the state also created a special "frontier zone" in which severe restrictions were placed on construction, land ownership and residency permits for foreigners. Despite the huge expanse of the Czechoslovak frontier, the Czechoslovak Government felt that border fortifications facilitated the nation's defense plans. Strategically, the fortifications were constructed to guard against a German pincer movement from the North and South -the main fear of General Krejci in the event of a war with Germany. The projected system, if completed, would have forced Germany to invade along an East-West axis rather than on a North-West axis 31 . If the Czechs could have protected their flanks, they could have withdrawn eastwards while awaiting aid from France. For this reason, the fortifications were to be much stronger in the North and the South than in the West. Priority was first given to especially vulnerable areas such as the Glatz depression, and later the Czechs hoped to complete two parallel lines of fortresses in northwest and northern Bohemia in order to channel and weaken German attacks. A projected defense line near Prague would have utilized the geographic features of the Elbe; such a line would have been effective against an attacker from the West but not from the North or South. Salients of Sudeten German territory such as the Egerland and the Rumburg salient would have been impossible to defend due to geography and the hostile local population; but where the terrain was more advantageous to the defender, works were constructed very close to the frontier 32 .
With the exception of several strong fortresses built in the Danube bridgehead at Engerau starting in 1934, work on the fortification of the Czech-Austrian frontier began only in 1937. Engerau was fortified in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, but the Czechs evidently felt that Bratislava must be protected by strongly fortified positions. Elsewhere along the Austrian frontier, Czech defenses were rather weak. A dam on the Dyje river could have been blown up to protect the region south of Brno, but the Czechoslovak General Staff hoped that Austrian independence would limit the scope of German military operations in the South. The Czechs were quite unprepared for the Anschluss, and in the summer of 1938 they had to try to complete works along the Nikolsburg-Znaim-Neuhaus line 33 . Along the Hungarian frontier, efforts were made to fortify communications centers and Danube crossing points which might invite Hungarian attacks. The Little Entente strategic planners allotted the main offensive role to Romania, so the Czechs were only concerned with the need for holding actions against the Hungarians. Unlike in the 1920's, in the 1930's the Czechs did not consider the Hungarian Army a major threat. Finally one might note that the Czechs also projected a fairly extensive system of fortifications along the Czechoslovak-Polish frontier. General Gamelin visited Poland in 1936 with the hopes of improving both Franco-Polish and Czechoslovak-Polish relations, but the Polish Inspector-General, Edward Smigh-Rydz, told Gamelin than an extension of the Czechoslovak works against Poland would be "inutile" 34 . The Czechs went ahead with plans to fortify the Polish frontier, though by 1938 only a few works were completed, such as works intended to block the mountain passes in Slovakia. A string of pill-boxes near Teschen was erected to hinder a German rather than a Polish advance, as the Czechs counted on Polish neutrality in the event of a war with Germany 35 .
Czechoslovakia's fortifications bore the distinct imprint of General Husarek, who was a former Russian legionary educated at the Czech technical high school in Brno. As Director of Fortifications, Husarek supervised a staff of over 400 military and civilian personnel seeking to develop the technical and military plans for the Czech fortifications system. Husarek felt than in a frontal assault on fortified positions, the enemy could always find some weakness. He therefore insisted that the physically strongest part of an individual pill-box should face the enemy directly, while protection was provided by flanking fire from two or more neighboring pill-boxes 36 .
Husarek thus developed a fortifications system which was basically linear in conception. His staff made extensive geographic surveys of potentially defensible areas and then exercised great care in constructing individual pill-boxes. By making optimum use of terrain, the Czechs gave their works the maximum value. The process took immense time and effort, requiring, for example, dozens of different kinds of concrete for the many different designs at individual sites. After observing a group of pill-boxes, the American Military Attache noted:
They are designed apparently to delay the enemy with a strong field of fire from admirably strong and protected field fortifications. They are always located where there is an excellent field of fire for long distances 37 .
The "fortifications" were actually of three main types. The smallest fortified positions were light works containing machine-guns. The second category consisted of pill-boxes built to withstand the fire of field guns and medium artillery up to 10 cm. The third category was composed of heavy fortresses built to withstand heavy artillery and bombs. German engineers classified these as Speerausbau, stellungsmässiger Ausbau and festungsmässiger Ausbau, depending on whether the works were built to withstand small arms fire, shrapnel or bombs 38 . While the smallest works held machineguns, the medium ones contained artillery, including 47 mm anti-tank casemate guns and 10 cm howitzers. The medium works held about twenty men and supplies (food and ammunition) for about two to three weeks. Even with additional protection provided by road demolitions, mines and anti-tank obstacles, such works could not have resisted a prolonged enemy attack without the assistance of a strong field army. The strongest fortresses, on the other hand, were intended to withstand major assaults. The defenses around Glatz, for example, were comparable to the petits ouvrages of the Maginot Line. Although on published maps of the Czechoslovak fortifications, a proper distinction is not made among these three categories, it may be emphasized that the smaller works had only tactical purposes, while the largest ones served both tactical and strategic purposes. The time needed for the construction of these works varied according to the works' size. Individual works (Einzelwerke) required three months for preparation and study of the terrain and twelve months for construction and equipping. The larger groups of works (Werkgruppe) required one year for preparation and three to four years for construction and equipping From a technological point of view, the Czechoslovak fortifications were pain- 43 . In some portions of the French frontier, the fortifications had a depth of 11 km 44 . In Czechoslovakia, the defenders' strongest positions had a depth of 2-5 km; but in weaker areas, especially in the South, there were portions of the frontier where the "fortifications" had a depth of only 100-150 m 4S ! In the sector Hultschin-Troppau, there were 120 armored turrets (Panzertürme) in the fortifications; 173 in Grülich-Mückenberg; 45 in Nächod; and 9 inTrautenau. Of 45 projected heavy fortresses in the South, only six were completed; there was not a single armored turret in the entire Znaim-Lundenburg sector (150 uninstalled turrets were in Czechoslovak factories in March, 193 9) 46 .
German engineers frequently described the Czech works as mere imitations of the French, but certainly this view (which is found in scattered references in the detailed German study, Denkschrift über die tschecho-slowakische Landesbefestigung) is exaggerated 47 . The Czech lands possessed a highly-developed armaments industry, and the Czechs certainly had no need to import French technology. Czech products such as the Bren gun, Skoda artillery and Ceskomoravskä-Kolben-Danek light tanks compared favorably with contemporary weaponry in other European nations. The Czech lands also had produced many of the highest-ranking engineers in the k.u. k. Army; the last k.u. k. Inspector-General of pioneers and engineers, General Frantisek (Franz) Skvor, was a Czech wholater served for over a decade in the post-war Czechoslovak Army. As many Czechs studied in France after the First World War, the Czechs were influenced by French military thought; but it would be pointless to depict the Czechoslovak works as mere imitations of the French. Despite Czechoslovakia's inability to fortify her frontier on a scale approaching that of France, the Czechs enjoyed a certain advantage of having made their decision to fortify their frontier after the French. Whereas France had taken nearly a decade to work out the details of the Maginot Line, Czechoslovakia was able to build her fortifications by utilizing the most modern French plans. Czechoslovakia's fortifica- When the Czechoslovak fortifications were surrendered in October, 1938, as most fortifications were located in the frontier zone, the works lost their military value as they were stripped of military equipment by the retreating Czechoslovak Army and then further dismantled by the Wehrmacht. Nonetheless, the Germans did conduct extensive tests in order to determine the efficacy of German artillery and to study various technical and tactical problems involved in fortifications fighting. As German inspection tours were undertaken not only by high-ranking officers in most branches of the army but also by Hitler himself, it was understandable that the fortifications became the object of considerable speculation. The fact that the Czechoslovak Army was not used in 1938 and that the fortifications were abandoned without fighting lent itself to popular comparisons of the Czechoslovak fortifications and the Maginot Line. German and Hungarian engineers published technical accounts of the fortifications stating that they had important weaknesses, but these studies were ignored by the critics of appeasement. However, used in conjunction with printed and unprinted German sources, published materials help provide a detailed picture of the ultimate strengths and weaknesses of the Czechoslovak fortifications system 53 .
In 1938 German engineers were concerned about the efficacy their artillery would have against Czech bunkers. The Germans made extensive studies for attacking fortifications and studied the appearance and location of works across the Czech frontier 54 . The major German worry was that medium and heavy artillery might prove inadequate for the task of breaking through the fortifications. In particular, it was not known what effect 10.5 cm guns would have on Czech works 55 .
Tests conducted on the Czechoslovak fortifications revealed that only some of the original German fears were justified 56 . A detailed report of one German trial firing shows that 10.5 cm guns were not entirely effective against Czech pill-boxes, even though major damage was achieved with 88 mm flak at 1,000 m and with a handgrenade thrown in the airvent of a pill-box. 3.7 cm anti-tank guns destroyed the pillbox embrasure with armorpiercing shells at a distance of 450 m. In another test, 15 cm howitzers were effective in breaking through the front of the bunkers S7 . Though conducted under ideal conditions, these tests indicated that the medium-sized pillboxes were very vulnerable to artillery fire, while the larger fortresses, like the petits ouvrages of the Maginot Line, would have been difficult to capture. The German experience in attacking the Maginot Line in 1939 sheds light on the value of the earlier tests conducted in Czechoslovakia. It should be noted, for example, that the devastating 88 mm flak could frequently not be successfully deployed in France owing to difficulties of terrain se . Of course, the more mobile 3.7 cm antitank guns were much more suitable for attack at close range S9 . The use of Stukas was also common in the attacks on the Maginot Line; in Czechoslovakia, the smaller size of the fortifications would have made dive bombing difficult, though the Luftwaffe planned to use Stukas and paratroopers in assaulting Czech positions. The Maginot Line also included a much greater variety of types of fortified works than the Czechoslovak system; and the Maginot Line was, for all intents and purposes, completed by the time of the German invasion. An examination of German successes and failures in France does not lead one to the conclusion that knowledge of the Czechoslovak fortifications was decisive in German victories in France. In the case of the famous work 505, "la Ferte" in the Montmedy sector, the Germans'attributed their success to three main factors (1) inadequate fire support from neighboring works (2) inadequate coverage of the roof area, permitting the penetration of pioneers and (3) excessive damage to the interior of the fortress as the result of charges thrown in one of the embrasures. In addition, the Germans noted that inadequate exits were partially responsible for the deaths of the 200 defenders 60 . However, in other cases in the Maginot Line, the Germans found fortresses that were suprisingly indestructible. At Schönenberg, neither 42 cm mortars nor bombing effectively incapacitated the defenders 61 . Nonetheless, the German evaluation ot combat reports and tests of artillery fire confirmed the effectiveness of heavy mortars, howitzers and flak in most cases where works were captured 62 .
Published studies of the Czechoslovak fortifications system pointed to a number of weaknesses and faults, though one must emphasize that such studies are usually written from a critical viewpoint. Generalmajor d. R. Ing. von Brosch-Aarenau, an Austrian officer writing in Wehrwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, noted that the Czechs ignored several lessons learned by the k.u.k. Army in World War One. Among these were (1) The problem of defense of terrain between the bunkers at night.
(2) The lack of interconnected bunkers such as proved effective in the Tyrol in 1915 and 1916. In many portions of the Czechoslovak system, the bunkers were connected only by cables which could have been cut by the attacker. It was important for the defenders to be able to keep in touch with one another directly. (3) The absence of comfortable living facilities and adequate exits. By cutting off the electricity and sealing off the exits, the attacker could have made the defender's life intolerable within a matter of days. (4) The extensive use of reinforced rather than solid concrete. This contradicted experiences of World War One in Belgium and the Tyrol showing that iron transmits shock more rapidly than solid concrete, which is also easier to repair 63 .
In this latter case, the Czechs modeled their construction practice on French plans 64 .
Such criticism nonetheless raises the question of whether the Czechs, by denying important posts in their army to former k.u.k. officers, ignored the military engi- 66 . In this sense, some of the speculation found in historical literature referring to the fortifications may be seen as being correct in that the completed fortifications were admirably constructed. However, nowhere, with the possible exception of Glatz, did the Germans consider that the Czechoslovak Army's defenses were strong enough to prevent breakthroughs. In the Glatz region, only the works in and around Adamsberg were largely incomplete 67 . German engineers and pioneers estimated that at least another year would have been required to make the system really efficient 68 The length of the German-Czech frontier facilitated the Germans' discovery of weakly-defended sectors, but the German task was made easier by two additional factors -the German population in the Sudetenland and Czechoslovak tactical doctrine. Of course, the vast length of the German-Czech frontier put an impossible strain upon the Czechs' resources. If the Czechs distributed 1,000,000 men on their frontiers with Germany, Poland and Hungary, they would have only had 250 men per kilometer 72 . Like the Pöles, the Czechs faced the problem of defending an expanse of territory in which there were major population and industrial centers near potential points of German attack. Although from a purely military point of view, withdrawal from the exposed territory appeared desirable, this was psychologically unacceptable 73 . After studying the Czechoslovak dispositions of September, 1938, the Germans concluded that the Czechs had been forced to use most of their reserves as tactical rather than strategic reserves. A suitable response to German attacks would thus have been extremely difficult 74 . In fairness to the Czechoslovak General Staff, however, one must note that the frontier by itself made reserves an almost insurmountable problem 75 .
The location of the fortifications in the German-inhabited frontier zone also weakened the value of Czech works. Many pill-boxes could be observed either directly across the German frontier or from German air space 76 . Dissident Sudeten Germans, who were often taken on as guides by the Wehrmacht, were also glad to point out the location of fortified positions near their homes. In July, 1938, two British observers in the Sudetenland gave a ride to a young Sudeten German boy, who surprised them by pointing out the location of nearly every important work in his district 77 . Large fortified zones were blocked off to local inhabitants, but many sectors of the frontier were weakly-fortified. Advanced knowledge of the weak sectors was extremely advantageous to the German attacker, who possessed detailed maps of Czechoslovak positions 78 . The Poles, in contrast, had only a general knowledge of Czech defenses before they marched into Teschen Silesia 79 . The Czechoslovak situation thus differed considerably from that in France, where the population was hostile to Germany. In obtaining information about the Maginot Line, the Wehrmacht usually relied only on air and ground observation. In some cases, such as in the fortifications facing the Saar and at the Breisach crossing, camouflage was excellent 80 . In Czechoslovakia, camouflage would have been effective only if the government had won greater loyalty among the Sudeten Germans.
A third factor which would have worked to the attacker's advantage was Czechoslovak tactical doctrine, which advocated the defense of a broad front. It is probable that tactical doctrine in France was less responsible for the French defeat in 1940 than were strategic errors of the French High Command, but the Czechoslovak Army lacked the materiel possessed by France, and the Czechs suffered an additional disadvantage of lacking a military tradition 81 . In 1937 the American Military Attache observed Czechoslovak maneuvers and noted that the soldiers, while excellently concealed, were dispersed over an extremely broad front 82 . The Czechs were well aware that Germany possessed superior mechanized forces, but their frontier compelled them to disperse their forces and thus lighten the task of the Germans considerably. Unfortunately, little information is available concerning the Czech willingness to accept casualties in local actions. The fortifications, of course, were designed to reduce the nation's manpower needs; but in view of the ambiguous attitude of minorities towards a war with Germany, the General Staff could never compensate for the lack of an inadequate reserve of manpower. A suitable response to German attacks could have compelled the Czechs to entail heavy losses. As the fortifications troops, the air force, and certain key infantry divisions were overwhelmingly Czech, heavy casualties could have created a serious ethnic imbalance within the army. Unlike Austria-Hungary, Czechoslovakia had no wartime experience by which the General Staff could have judged its manpower problems. The eventual capitulation of the Czechs without a fight in September, 1938 may be traced in part to the uncertainty of how the army could be utilized in a wartime situation. Despite certain gaps in our knowledge about Czechoslovak defenses, there is certainly evidence available which may permit us to draw conclusions about the Czechoslovak position in September, 1938. German engineers did evince a high regard for Czech technology, and the Germans admitted that if finished, the Czechoslovak system could have been quite effective. German reports nonetheless indicated that the Czechs lacked both the time and resources to complete their fortifications by the time of the Munich crisis. As the conclusion of the German Denkschrift über die tschecho-slowakische Landesbefestigung noted: "Wer alles decken will, deckt nichts" 83 . 
